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Article 1

VICTIMS' RIGHTS SYMPOSIUM

THE CRIME VICTIM IN A SYSTEM OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
GOVERNOR MARIO M. CUOMO*

[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser
also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is
narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true.'
If we take the justice out of the criminal justice system we
2
leave behind a system that serves only the criminal.
In the last few decades, the role of the crime victim in the criminal justice system has evolved dramatically. By reinvesting crime
victims with a significant role in the criminal justice system and
affording them a greater prospect of being made whole through
either civil damages or criminal restitution and reparation, a his* B.A. 1953, St. John's University; J.D. 1956, St. John's University School of Law. Governor Cuomo is currently serving his third term as governor of New York.
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT vi (1982) (statement of
the Chairman, Lois Haight Herrington).
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torical loop is closing. In New York State, events of the recently
concluded legislative session have made a substantial contribution
in this area.
Still however, the role and stature of the crime victim in our
present criminal justice system is not what it should be. Indeed, as
an enlightened society, we must press on to fully empower crime
victims in a manner consistent with the constitutional rights of the
accused. To understand what must be done prospectively, we
must understand what has happened historically.
I.

THE EVOLVING LEGAL STATURE OF THE VICTIM

The role and stature of the crime victim in what might be
thought of, in the largest sense, as a system of "criminal justice"
has changed dramatically throughout history.' In primitive times,
when the struggle for survival regularly pitted one individual
against another, there was little to distinguish "crime" from the
continuous struggle for existence. The law was the law of the
strongest or the most clever; and the "crime victim" was not just
an important player-if he survived, he was probably one of only
two players, performing the role of victim, prosecutor, judge, and
sometimes executioner. The concepts of punishment, deterrence,
and compensation were probably inextricably intertwined and
personal. Justice, if any, belonged to the strongest or the most
clever.
As primitive family, clan, and tribal groups became established,
social control became more than a matter of how individuals coexisted-it became a matter of how groups coexisted. A crime committed against one member of the group became, by extension, an
offense against the group itself. One individual did not seek justice
from another individual; rather, one clan would seek justice from
another clan. This would often result in behavior characterized as
the blood-feud. The role and stature of the individual crime victim thus became minimized."
The blood-feud and related behaviors often led to protracted
intergenerational conflict in the nature of a perpetual feud. This
s For an excellent summary of the history of the crime victim, see STEPHEN SCHAFER,
His CRIMINAL 5-32 (1977) (discussing history of criminalvictim relationship).
' Id. at 6-8.
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was increasingly at odds with the development of a material culture and its attendant commerce, especially in the developing
communities. Recognizing the conflict, the generational response
to crime was rejected in favor of a transactional approach, which
viewed the commission of a crime and the appropriate response as
one discrete transaction. This approach recognized the individual
right and interest of the crime victim vis-a-vis the criminal offender. This transactional approach was evidenced by the Mosaic
Dispensation among the Hebrews of biblical times, which provided for restitution and reparation. Among the ancient Greeks, a
"death fine" was created which mandated the payment of a fine to
the family of a crime victim.'
This system of transactional compensation continued to evolve
in the Middle Ages and became known as the "composition," a
mutual settlement or agreement between the victim and the offender. The community's system of "criminal justice" came to operate very much like our current tort law, complete with elements
of punishment, damages, and the opportunity for private compromise. The composition eventually evolved into an elaborately detailed system of specific damages, sanctioned by the community
for every kind or degree of injury which could be inflicted, and
continued to represent and reinforce the unification of the concepts of punishment and compensation. 6
With the development of centralized government in the latter
half of the Middle Ages, the composition was subjected to increasing community "judicial" controls. The community gradually
came to claim a share of the victim's compensation, and as the
community's governmental authority increased, so did its share of
the victim's compensation. It has been suggested that the community's share of the compensation may have represented one of
three concepts: 1) a "commission" for brokering the reconciliation between the criminal offender and the victim; 2) the price
offered by the community to the offender for the opportunity of
redemption; or 3) the price of protection, given by the community, to the offender against possible retaliation on the part of the
victim.7 ,

5 Id.

at 8-9.

o Id. at 10-13.
7

Id. at 12-14.
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The community's share gradually devolved into a fine paid to
the king or the overlord, thereby representing a punishment
rather than compensation. The victim's share continued to represent compensation, but it steadily decreased, until the king or
overlord eventually claimed all of it as part of the state's monopolization of the institution of punishment. It was through this process that the rights of the victim became separated from the rights
of the state in responding to the offense. Furthermore, there began to develop two very different sorts of jurisprudence: criminal
law, in which the only parties were the state and the offender; and
civil law, in which the only parties were the offender and the
victim. 8
This continuing divergence of criminal and civil jurisprudence
suffered a set-back in the 1600s, as the European social and cultural system was transposed to the American colonies. Governmental authority was less imperial and centralized in the colonies
than it was in the urban commercial centers of Europe. This resulted in the ascendance of the crime victim once again to the
pivotal role in the process of identification, investigation, and
prosecution of the offender. The exacting of restitution from the
offender reflected the customs of Europe in the early Middle
Ages.9
However, this pivotal role of the victim was short-lived. Commercial and property interests in the colonies increased, and urban commercial centers grew. Dissatisfaction with an increasingly
inefficient and unworkable system of individual justice prompted
calls for change. The writers of the eighteenth century Enlightenment articulated a theory of "social contract." One of the most
influential works of the time, Essay on Crimes and Punishment by
Cesare Beccaria, 10 set the stage for a re-examination of the proper
function of the criminal justice process in society.
Becarria argued that a criminal justice system should respond to
society's need to protect the law-abiding, contract-abiding citizen
from the criminal, who breaches the social contract." Society itId. at 14-16.
For an explication of the role of the victim in colonial American criminal justice, see
William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in CriminalJustice: The Return of the
Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 651-54 (1976).
(1764).
10 CESARE B. BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
8

11 Id.

at 74.
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self, Beccaria would argue, is the victim of crime, and society's
response should serve only socially useful purposes. It's goal was
to deter further criminal conduct, both as to that criminal and as
to others, and to effect a reparation to society for the socially disruptive effect of the criminal's conduct. Punishment should not be
inflicted to effect private retribution on behalf of the individual
victim, nor to effect reparation for the damage caused to the individual victim."2 Beccaria thus argued that the individual crime victim should be divorced from the purpose or effect of the criminal
justice system; that the only proper role for the individual crime
victim was as an informant and witness; and that the only redress
available to the individual crime victim was the civil suit.
Beccaria's ideas took root and flourished in America in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Americans evidenced a
willingness to repudiate the English common law criminal justice
traditions in favor of the principles of rationality and utilitarianism.'" Thus, the administration of American criminal justice became victim-blind.
II.

THE RESURGENCE OF INVOLVEMENT OF THE CRIME VICTIM IN
NEW YORK

Although the issues of victim compensation and reparation
predominated at a number of international prison congresses in
the latter part of the nineteenth century, the concept of advocacy
on behalf of the individual crime victim, and the inequalities inherent in a victim-blind criminal justice system did not have a
profound impact on public policy-making in the United States. Indeed, it wasn't until the 1960s, when the idea of governmentfunded crime victim compensation began to gain acceptance.
Government-funded compensation for crime victims was first instituted in Switzerland in 1937.1" The idea was raised and forcefully advocated within the British Commonwealth in 1957,"' and
government-funded compensation programs were initiated in
New Zealand in 1963, and the United Kingdom in 1964.16 In
1965, California became the first state in the United States to en12 Id.

" McDonald, supra note 9, at 654-55.
"4 SCHAFER, supra note 3, at 132.
" Margery Fry, Justice for Victims, THE OBsERVER (London), July 7, 1957, at 8.
16 SCHAFER, supra note 3, at 110.
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act a law to compensate victims of violent crime, with a program
to be operated by the California Department of Welfare. 17 In
1966, New York enacted a law to create its own crime victim compensation program, but this program was, and still is, administered by an independent agency created for this singular purpose-the Crime Victims Compensation Board (now the Crime
Victims Board). State after state as well as the federal government followed suit, and as a result there are crime victim compensation programs in all but a handful of states.
In its first fiscal year of operation (1967-68), the New York
State Crime Victims Compensation Board (the "Board") received
claims from 276 claimants, and made 43 awards of compensation
averaging $750.00." So few claims were decided that first year
that the Board began the practice of publishing a synopsis of each
of the claims decided in its annual report.20
The number of claims received by the Board increased rapidly
in subsequent years of operation; in fiscal year 1968-69, 519
claims were accepted and investigated, in addition to 1,307 inquiries, many of which were apparent claims that were rejected for
further processing after a preliminary investigation." In fiscal
year 1969-70, 929 claims were filed, 22 and in fiscal year 1970-71,
1,594 claims were received and filed. 23 This rapid increase necessitated the elimination of publishing a synopsis of each of the
claims decided. The number of awards of compensation also increased as the amount of claims increased: 220 awards in fiscal
1968-69, 336 awards in fiscal 1969-70, and 458 awards in fiscal
1970-7 1.24 This trend has continued virtually uninterrupted to
17 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 1549. An act to add Section 1500.02 to the Welfare and Institutions Code and to add Section 11211 to Division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions Code as
proposed by Assembly Bill No. 1682, relating to aid to families with dependent children.
Passed by the Assembly June 17, 1965.
18 See ch. 894, § 1, [19661 N.Y. Laws 1889 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 622 (McKinney 1982).
1" 1967 FIRST REPORT OF THE CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION BOARD 6-7, 9 (1968) [herein-

after FIRST REPORT].

20 Id. at 11-40.

21 1968 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CRIME
[hereinafter SECOND REPORT].
"' 1969 THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CRIME

[hereinafter THIRD REPORT].

VICTIMS COMPENSATION BOARD 7

(1969)

VICTIMS COMPENSATION BOARD 5

(1970)

"* 1970 FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION BOARD 5 (1971)
[hereinafter FOURTH REPORT].
14 SECOND REPORT, supra note 21, at 7; THIRD REPORT, supra note 22, at 10; FOURTH

REPORT, supra note 23, at 10.
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this day.""
The creation of New York's Crime Victims Compensation
Board marked the beginning of a period of heightened consciousness regarding the needs, rights, and interests of crime victims. In
the course of its first twenty-five years of operation the Board has
provided operational, organizational, and legislative leadership for
the recognition and enhancement of crime victims' rights in New
York. With the steady increase in crime, and its impact, both real
and perceived, upon the public, the concept of victims' rights in
New York and elsewhere began to gain currency. The twenty-five
year period from 1966 through 1991, witnessed the start of a
modern era of crime victims' rights in New York.
III.

THE ADVENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL CRIME VICTIM ADVOCACY

Following the creation of the Crime Victims Compensation
Board, the elements of a rudimentary crime victim advocacy and
support network began to develop.
Law enforcement and prosecution agencies were among the
first to recognize the need to aid victims of crime. In 1974, the
Kings County (Brooklyn) District Attorney's Office established
one of the first victim/witness programs in New York State.2"
This was part of a nationwide effort initiated with Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) grant funds to create
model programs to aid victims of crime. The New York County
(Manhattan) District Attorney's Witness Aid Program was established one year later. That same year the Rochester Police Department started one of the first law enforcement victim assistance
programs in the nation as a pilot project with funding from an
LEAA grant. Since 1974-75, many other law enforcement and
prosecution agencies throughout the state have established victim/witness assistance programs.
However, the principal strength behind the crime victim advocacy movement came from victims, who formed grassroots selfhelp groups and coalitions. One of the first, the Albany County
'" A summary of the historic trend in the numbers of compensation claims "accepted,"
and the number and total amounts of awards of compensation made, can be found in the
most recent annual report available from the Crime Victims Board. 1990-91 TWENTYFOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CRIME VICTIMS BOARD 11, 17-18 (1991).
" NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER, LOOKING BACK MOVING FORWARD-A HISTORY OF THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Arlington, Va., 1992).
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Rape Crisis Center, was formed in 1975 by rape and sexual assault
victims. Many other groups followed, including RID (Remove Intoxicated Drivers) in 1978, the Gay and Lesbian Anti-violence
Project in 1980, Parents of Murdered Children of New York
State in 1981, the rape crisis centers at St. Lukes/Roosevelt Hospital and St. Vincents Hospital in Manhattan in 1982, and the
New York Chapter of Victims for Victims in 1985.
The New York State Coalition Against Domestic Violence was
formed in 1978, bringing together many groups in that field, and
in 1981, a "hot line" was established with state and federal funding. In 1985, a victims' rights group known as the Western Coalition was the first of several state-wide coalitions created to bring
together the constituencies of different victims' organizations.
Since 1985, the Downstate, Central, Northeastern, and Southern
Tier coalitions have been formed. The coalitions have worked together successfully to augment funding, to promote legislative initiatives, and to enhance the availability and diversity of new
services.
Not-for-profit crime victims services and advocacy groups were
formed at both the local and national levels. The Victim Services
Agency was created in 1978 in New York City. The National Victim Center opened its New York offices in 1986. To facilitate and
to partially fund the work of these and other victim advocacy
groups, the Crime Victims Board was given the statutory authority and appropriation necessary to provide grants-in-aid funding
to crime victim organizations and programs, beginning in fiscal
year 1981-82.27
The crime victims' advocacy organizations collaborated in a
show of solidarity in 1986 when they held the first annual New
York City Candlelight Vigil. Dedicated to victims of crime, the
Candlelight Vigil has become a nationally recognized event sponsored not only by victims' rights advocates, but by the religious
community, labor unions, and civic groups.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS

A survey of the legislation which has been implemented in New
York during the last 25 years is instructive since it reflects the
"7 See ch. 688, § 12 [1985] N.Y. Laws 1748 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 631-a (McKinney Supp. 1993).
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experience of other states and can contribute significantly to understanding how crime victims' rights throughout the nation have
evolved. Generally, New York's crime victim legislation can be
compartmentalized into three categories: 1) enhancement of the
victim's civil right of recovery; 2) fortification of the victims's
right to restitution and reparation as an element of criminal sentencing; and 3) empowerment of the crime victim in an otherwise
offender-oriented criminal justice system.
A.

Enhanced Civil Right of Recovery

The sole purpose for which the Crime Victims Compensation
Board was created was to establish an agency through which victims of crime could be compensated for their out-of-pocket economic losses. However, an additional and highly visible mission
was added to the mandate of the Board in 1978 with the enactment of New York's original "Son of Sam law." 8
The Son of Sam law was enacted in response to media reports
that the serial murderer David Berkowitz, (the "Son of Sam") was
to be offered enormous sums of money for the exclusive rights to
his crime story. This prompted an expression of outrage on the
part of Governor Carey and the legislature, and they moved
quickly to enact a law that would ensure that any such profits
would be applied first to the benefit of the victim(s) of the crime.
This law became a model for similar laws enacted by a majority of
the states and the federal government. 9
Among other things, the Son of Sam law provided that any "entity" contracting with a person "accused or convicted of a crime,"
80 or any person "who has voluntarily and intelligently admitted
the commission of a crime for which such person is not prosecuted,"8 1 for the production of a book or other work describing
or depicting the crime, must pay over to the Crime Victims Board
any moneys owing to that person under the contract. 2 Once the

" Ch. 823, § 1, [1977] N.Y. Laws 1321 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1993).
" For a list of states having similar statutes, see Karen M. Ecker & Margot J. O'Brien,
Note, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti: Can New York's Son of Sam Law Survive First
Amendment Challenge?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1075, n.6 (1991).
Ch. 417, § 1, [1978] N.Y. Laws 722 (McKinney) (repealed 1992).
31 Ch. 445, § 3, [1981] N.Y. Laws 909 (McKinney) (repealed 1992).
32 Ch. 417, § 1, [1978] N.Y. Laws 722 (McKinney) (repealed 1992).

10
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Board received these funds, the Son of Sam law required them to
be deposited into an escrow account to be available for a period of
five years, to any victim of that person who had obtained a civil
judgment."3 Regardless of when the act occurred which was the
source of the moneys, victims had up to five years from the date
the funds were escrowed to institute an action for damages under
a special statute of limitations provision. Any balance remaining in
the escrow account after payments to victims and certain other
creditors was to be returned to that person after five years."M
The crime victim's right to civil recovery was further enhanced
in 1983, when the Civil Practice Law and Rules were amended to
provide, independent of the Son of Sam law, yet another statute
of limitations within which a crime victim could bring a civil action against the offender: a period of one year from the termination of the corresponding criminal action."5 This change gave
crime victims a special opportunity to recover damages regardless
of the absence of the criminal's storytelling for profit.
B.

Fortification of the Right to Restitution and Reparation

Historically in New York, the victim's right to restitution and
reparation was available only if the offender was sentenced to probation or conditional discharge, and only in an amount the offender could afford to pay.3 6 In the modern era of victims' rights,
this right to restitution and reparation has undergone considerable and almost yearly expansion.
In 1980, New York's Penal Law and Criminal Procedure Law
were amended to provide statutory authority for a court to order
restitution and reparation as a component of sentencing when the
offender is sentenced to a period of incarceration.3 7 However, the
amount of restitution and reparation the court could require without the consent of the offender was limited to $5,000.00 for a
felony conviction, and $1,000.00 for a misdemeanor conviction.
a Id.
34

Id.

Ch. 95, § 1, [19831 N.Y. Laws 278 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. CIVIL PRAC. L.
& R. § 215(8) (McKinney 1990).
. See, e.g., ch. 1030, § 65.10(f) [1965] N.Y. Laws 1556 (McKinney) (current version at
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(2)(g) (McKinney 1987).
I" Ch. 290, §§ 2-5, [1980] N.Y. Laws 472 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. CRIM.
PRoc. L. §§ 420.10-420.30 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993)).
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The right to restitution was made more meaningful with 1982
amendments, which required a pre-sentence investigation report
to include, when relevant to the sentence recommendation or disposition, what has now come to be known as the "victim impact
statement. '"88 These amendments required the victim impact
statement to include "an analysis of the victim's version of the offense, the extent of injury or economic loss or damage to the victim relating to disposition including the amount of restitution
sought by the victim. . .

."

The victim impact statement put the

victim's interests in the record. One year later, a provision was
added to ensure that the economic interests to the crime victim
would be brought to the court's attention. The new provision required a district attorney to notify the sentencing court when the
crime victim sought restitution, including the amount of restitution sought and the extent of the injury or loss to the victim, and
required the sentencing court to consider ordering restitution to
the victim as part of the sentence. 9
In addition to the change in sentencing procedures made in
1984, the Legislature expanded the crime victims substantive
rights by authorizing the sentencing court to order restitution or
reparation to a victim of crime in excess of the statutory limits,
provided the excess represented either the return of the victim's
property or reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by the
victim prior to sentencing.40 The removal of the $5,000.00 ceiling
for restitution of a felony eliminated one artificial barrier which
could unfairly restrict a crime victim's ability to obtain full compensation for losses or injuries suffered. In addition, laws were enacted to increase the monetary amount of restitution a crime victim could recover. In 1986, New York's Penal Law was amended
to increase the maximum statutory limits on orders of restitution
for felonies from $5,000.00 to $10,000.00, and for misdemeanors
and violations from $1,000.00 to $5,000.00.""
Beyond these legislative amendments imposing more stringent
- Ch. 612, § 1, [1982] N.Y. Laws 1569 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW,
§ 1.05 (McKinney 1987).
Ch. 397, § 2, [1983] N.Y. Laws 644 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 60.27(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
40 Ch. 468, § 1, [1983] N.Y. Laws 868 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y.
PENAL LAW
§ 60.27(5) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1993).
Ch. 615, § 1, [1986] N.Y. Laws 1305 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 60.27(5) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1993).
39

41
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requirements on prosecutors to seek restitution on behalf of victims, victims were ensured a greater opportunity to collect restitution by additional legislative enactments in 1985, which required a
sentencing court to order the payment by the offender of any restitution or reparation to the victim prior to the payment of any
fine. This legislation made crime victims' interests paramount by
42
requiring courts to give priority to restitution orders over fines.
To further facilitate the collection of restitution, the Executive
Law was amended to provide that conditions of parole had to include a requirement that the parolee comply with any order of
restitution previously imposed, and that a discharge from parole
would be conditioned upon a good faith effort to comply with any
such order of restitution.4 3
C. Empowerment of the Crime Victim in the CriminalJustice Process
The enhancement of New York's restitution laws manifested
the legislature's increasing recognition of the victim's entitlement
to compensation from the offender. At the same time the legislature came to understand and to accept the victim's right to have a
role in the processing and disposition of the criminal defendant's
case. Consistent with this trend, New York has been developing
and expanding the right of crime victims to meaningful involvement in, and protection and information from, the criminal justice process.
One of the first expressions of this understanding and acceptance was the enactment in 1978 of an amendment to New York's
Criminal Procedure law, which required a district attorney to notify a crime victim of the final disposition of the criminal case
against the offender, if the crime victim has so requested.4" This
enactment began the process of breaking down invisible barriers
which often kept crime victims isolated from a process in which
they had a deep personal interest. Recognizing the importance of
the participation in the criminal justice process of victims and witnesses, the legislature amended New York's Penal Law in 1982 to
42 Ch. 506, § 2, [1985] N.Y. Laws 1275 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 120.03 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
48 Ch. 466, § 1, [19861 N.Y. Laws 973 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. EXEc. LAW
§ 259-i(2)(a) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1993).
Ch. 496, § 1, [1978] N.Y. Laws 893 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 440.50 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993).
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prohibit an employer from discharging or penalizing an employee
who was subpoenaed to attend a criminal proceeding. 6
In 1983, Article 22 of the Executive Law was amended to require that police stations, precinct houses, and other appropriate
locations prominently display posters giving notice of the existence and availability of crime victim compensation, of laws
prohibiting the intimidation of crime victims, and of the local
availability of crime victim services.4 6 This constituted recognition
by state government that victims' rights could be rendered virtually meaningless unless adequate notice was provided.
In 1984 I proposed as legislation, and was privileged to sign
into law, the Fair Treatment Standards for Crime Victims
Act"-the first of its kind in the nation. This law required the
Commissioner of the Division of Criminal Justice and the Chairman of the Crime Victims Board, in consultation with other officials, to promulgate standards for the appropriate treatment of
victims in the criminal justice system.
The Fair Treatment Standards Act was sweeping in scope.
Among its many objectives, it provided that victims be given information about the criminal justice system generally, and particularly about the criminal case in which he or she was involved, as
well as information about available victim services and compensation. The act required special solicitude toward the victim on the
part of the district attorney in considering release of the criminal
defendant pending further proceedings, in the disposition of certain aggravated felonies, and in the sentencing of the convicted
offender. As enacted this legislation provided secure areas for
crime victims and other prosecution witnesses waiting to testify,
for the prompt return of property held for evidentiary purposes,
and for assistance with a victim's or witness's employer or creditors. The act required victim assistance education to be provided
in law enforcement and district attorney training programs, and
agencies which regularly provide services or otherwise interact
with crime victims to review their policies and procedures with a
48 Ch. 823, § 1, [1982] N.Y. Laws 1984 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. PENAL
" 215.14 (McKinney 1988).
,6 Ch. 77, § 1, [1983] N.Y. Laws 252 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. EXEC.
§ 625-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1993).
-7 Ch. 94, § 1, [1984] N.Y. Laws 165 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. EXEc.
§§ 640-645 (McKinney Supp. 1993).

LAW
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view to improving their services and their responsiveness to crime
victims.4 8
In 1985, the process of re-inclusion of the crime victim in the
criminal justice process continued with a statutory change requiring the Board of Parole to consider any written statement submitted by a crime victim, or in certain cases the victim's family, in
determining the suitability of a criminal offender for parole release. This legislation also required that the crime victim be notified of the right to submit such a written statement.4 9 That same
year the crime victim, and the family of a victim under certain
circumstances, were granted the right to receive notification from
the Department of Correctional Services of the release, escape, or
absconding of an inmate, and of any subsequent capture, if the
victim or the victim's family filed a request for such notification.50
These changes constituted a substantial expansion of the victim's
involvement beyond the adjudication of guilt and sentencing
stages of the criminal justice system.
In 1987, New York's Executive Law was further amended to
establish a Witness Protection Program within the Division of
Criminal Justice Services, to be operated in consultation with the
Crime Victims Board, to establish standards and to provide funds
for witness protection and relocation program services to be provided by local provider agencies. 5 1 Two years later New York's
Penal Law was amended to provide for the imposition at sentencing of a "crime victim assistance fee" to be credited to the State's
criminal justice improvement account, which provides funding for
the witness protection program and the crime victim compensation program.5 2 This represented part of a legislative effort to
shift the economic burden imposed upon the state by criminal activity to the party most appropriate to bear that burden-the
criminal offender.

Is

Ch. 414, § 1, [1985] N.Y. Laws 1102 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. EXEc. LAW

§ 640 (McKinney Supp. 1993).

Ch. 78, § 2, [1985] N.Y. Laws 383 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
§ 440.50(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
- Ch. 504, § 1, [1985] N.Y. Laws 1265 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. CORRECT.
LAW § 149-a (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1993).
51 Ch. 711, § 1, [1987] N.Y. Laws 1244 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. EXEc. LAW
§ 835(11)-(13) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
8- Ch. 62, § 84 [1989] N.Y. Laws 273 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 60.35 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
49

LAW

1992]

THE CRIME VICTIM

In the latter part of the 1980s and the first two years of the
1990s the volume of crime victim-related legislation continued
apace. However, there was a subtle change in the nature of the
legislation. The bulk of the legislation during this five year period
was victim specific, focusing on matters relating to victims of sexual violence, domestic violence, and child victims. This trend, and
the legislation that was adopted during this period, merit separate
review and discussion. To the extent that the legislation of that
period is not particularly linked to the three focal points of this
article, namely the re-inclusion of the crime victim in the offender
based criminal justice system, enhanced rules of restitution and
reparation, and a fortification of the civil right of recovery, I leave
that analysis for another article.
V.

SETBACK TO THE PROGRESSIVE ENHANCEMENT OF VICTIMS'
RIGHTS

In 1986, the Crime Victims Board became aware of a contract
between the publishing house of Simon & Schuster and convicted
organized crime figure Henry Hill. Hill had earlier agreed with
writer Nicholas Pileggi to collaborate on a book about his life of
crime, and they subsequently arranged with Simon & Schuster to
publish the book Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family. The Board reviewed the book and the contract, and in 1987 issued a "Proposed
Determination and Order," declaring that the book Wiseguy was
subject to the Son of Sam law.
Simon & Schuster responded by filing a civil rights action in
federal court, claiming that the Board's action and the Son of Sam
statute unduly burdened the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of speech. Upon cross-motions for summary judgment,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York found the statute and the Board's action to be consistent
with the first amendment, 53 and a divided Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.5 4 Simon & Schuster appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, and certiorari was granted.
On December 10, 1991, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed
" Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 724
F. Supp. 170, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 501
(1991).
" Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 784 (Newman, J. dissenting).
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the Court of Appeals and, in a decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, held that New York's Son of Sam law violated
the first amendment by targeting speech of a certain content for a
financial burden placed on no other speech, without a properly
narrow compelling state interest in doing so. 55
The Supreme Court's analysis began with the recognition that
"[a] statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the
content of their speech." 5 6 The Court then found that the Son of
Sam law was "such a content-based statute,1 57 and determined
that New York must therefore demonstrate that the statute was
''necessary to serve a compelling state interest and [was] narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.""
The Court acknowledged a number of potentially compelling
state interests, including "ensuring that victims of crime are compensated by those who harm them," depriving criminals of the
profits of their crimes, and . . . using these funds to compensate
victims," and "compensating victims from the fruits of the
crime."" The Court also acknowledged an interest, though not
necessarily compelling, in "preventing wrongdoers from dissipating their assets before victims can recover." 0 However, the Court
found no compelling interest on the part of the State in the narrow focus of the Son of Sam law on assets derived from "storytelling" as contrasted with "any of the criminal's other assets."'
The Court stated that this distinction among assets had "nothing
to do with the State's interest in transferring the proceeds of
crime from criminals to their victims." 6 2
In essence, the Court decided that "the State has a compelling
interest in compensating victims from the fruits of the crime, but
little if any interest in limiting such compensation to the proceeds
of the wrongdoer's speech about the crime."63 The Court then
directed its inquiry to a determination of "whether the Son of
6 Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512.
Id. at 508.
57 Id.
" Id. at 509.
9 Id. at 509-11.

o Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509.
61Id. at 510.
62

Id.

63 Id. at 511.
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Sam law [was] narrowly
tailored to advance the former, not the
64
latter, objective.
The Court concluded that, as "a means of ensuring that victims
are compensated from the proceeds of the crime, the Son of Sam
law is significantly overinclusive" because "the statute applies to
works on any subject, provided that they express the author's
thoughts or recollections about his crime, however tangentially or
incidentally," and because "the statute's broad definition of 'person convicted of a crime' enables the [Crime Victims] Board to
escrow the income of any author who admits in his work to having
committed a crime, whether or not the author was ever actually
accused or convicted."6 " Therefore, "the Son of Sam law clearly
reaches a wide range of literature that does not enable a criminal
to profit from his crime while a victim remains uncompensated.""
Thus, the statute is not "narrowly tailored to achieve the State's
objective of compensating crime victims from the profits of
crime," and therefore, on its face, "the statute is inconsistent with
67
the First Amendment.
While New York's Son of Sam law never had a considerable impact on the immediate lives or interests of the vast majority of
crime victims in New York, it had nonetheless constituted an important statement of public policy: an agency of state government
will ensure that a criminal will not profit from the sale of the story
of his or her criminal misdeeds without first making those profits
available to compensate the victim(s). The repudiation by the Supreme Court of this public policy statement demanded an immediate response.
A.

New York's Response to the Simon & Schuster Decision

The Supreme Court's decision in Simon & Schuster gave New
York an opportunity to reconsider how the state could best serve
the interest in compensating the victim and ensuring that the
criminal did not profit from the crime in a manner consistent with
the Constitution. In March 1992, I was joined by Attorney General Robert Abrams in proposing a bill containing a number of
" Id.

" Id.
"Id.
67

112 S. Ct. at 512.
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legislative initiatives designed to enlarge the opportunity for
crime victims to be compensated by the criminals who have
harmed them. This bill formed the basis for subsequent negotiation with the legislature resulting in the enactment of a "new"
Son of Sam law, together with a package of other statutory
amendments which significantly enlarged the availability of compensation to crime victims from offenders. 8
This new enactment established a seven-year period of limitations to bring a civil action in damages for all intentional torts
arising from the commission of a crime. In recognition of the distinct and compelling state interest in preventing criminals from
profiting from their crimes, this enactment created a second and
discrete three-year period of limitations, measured from the time
a crime victim discovered that the perpetrator has received or is
receiving profits from the crime, to bring a civil action for
damages.
It strengthened the opportunity for the crime victim to seek
and receive restitution and reparation ordered by the sentencing
court in the criminal proceeding, by helping to ensure that the
victim is informed of the right to restitution and reparation, and
by requiring sentencing judges to order restitution and reparation
when it is requested by the victim, unless the interests of justice
truly mandate otherwise.
No provision of this new enactment singled out speech for any
particular burden, but rather it implemented broadly, wisely, and
fairly a vision of essential justice between those who have been
hurt and those who have hurt them. The underlying premise of
the original Son of Sam law was affirmed: it is grossly unjust for a
criminal to profit from criminality and leave the victim
uncompensated.
Perhaps because of the widespread interest generated by the
events surrounding the Son of Sam law, the 1992 legislative session significantly advanced the victims' rights agenda on other
fronts. Of primary importance was an amendment to the Criminal
Procedure Law to provide that the victim of a felony crime shall
- Ch. 618, § 2, [1992] N.Y. Laws 1669 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. CIv. PRAC.
L. & R. § 6201 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1993); ch. 618, § 5, [1992] N.Y. Laws 1670
(McKinney) (current version at N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 410.90 (McKinney 1983 & Supp.
1993); ch. 618, § 14, [1992] N.Y. Laws 1674 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 65.05(3) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
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have the right of "allocution"--the right to make an oral statement to the sentencing court with regard to any matter relevant
to the question of sentence. 69 This constitutes a profound elevation of the victim's role in sentencing, which previously consisted
of the comparatively dry recitation usually found in the written
victim impact statements.
VI.

AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE

We tend not to think about crime victims when we think about
crime because of the way crime is treated in the news and in
drama -we are encouraged to identify with the other actors: the
criminals, the police, and the lawyers.
Americans have always been fascinated with good guys and
bad guys . . . . Both criminals and police officers can go behind the scenes, into the secret places in the community-the
darkened bars, the brothels, the courtrooms, the jails. They
are the insiders, the ones who know what's really going on.
Most of them are loners; they have no families to tie them
down. Their nights are charged with excitement, filled with
adventure. They don't have to keep their tempers or mind
their manners. Nobody tells them what to do . . . . A crime
victim is quite unexciting by comparison. The crime-story
victim rarely holds the center of the stage because victims are
neither glamorous nor powerful. The victim is a loser, an ineffective cipher in the power game. So crime victims are virtually ignored, clearly categorized as the least interesting people in the drama.1 0
Increasingly, however, we as a society are coming to realize that
these "least interesting people" are ourselves, our families, and
our friends. We must continue to think about crime victims because they, we, are the mainstream of our society. To ignore the
needs of crime victims in our society is to ignore the needs of
most of our people-the good, moral, upright, hard-working, social contract-abiding majority.
Our agenda for the future must continue to focus on refining a
criminal justice system that acknowledges and includes the crime
69 Ch. 307, § 1, [1992] N.Y. Laws 1006 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. CRIM. PROc.
LAW § 380.50 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
70 MORTON BARD & DAWN SANGREY, THE CRIME VICrIM's BOOK

5 (1986).
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victim in the process by which our society addresses the problem
of what to do with the criminal offender. The criminal justice process should continue to be viewed not just as the means of bringing closure to the criminal transaction of the offender, but also as
the means of bringing closure to the sense of violation the victim
has been made to bear. Because a fundamental tenet of our free
society is the social responsibility of the individual, our criminal
justice system must ensure that criminal offenders bear to the extent possible the social and economic burden of their crime.
This agenda for the future must focus not only on the criminal
justice issues resulting from crime, but also on the principal underlying causes of crime itself-among them the alienation experienced by too many of our fellow citizens who fail for whatever
reason to share our values, our hopes, and our expectations.
When we are able to address adequately these underlying causes of
crime, and thereby to reduce the incidence of crime itself and the
need for the intervention of a criminal justice system, then we
shall have performed the greatest public service possible to alleviate the burden borne by the crime victim.

